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Introduction
In the last decade, Brazil’s foreign policy strategy in the world at large has 
attributed a considerable role to the evolving South-South relations, which implied 
the development of significant business and trade ties with African countries while 
dully accompanied by the political backing of both former-President Lula da Silva 
and President Dilma Rousseff ’s government. Brazil’s refocus on Africa has thus 
come to attract sufficient attention, while primarily focused on traditional areas 
of interaction, such as high-level political dialogue, exponential economic and 
trade interactions, and disbursement of technical cooperation assistance.
If this overall relation were to be framed in terms of power, however, some 
problems seemingly surface. Indeed, if power is understood in a Dahlian-causal 
and relational fashion, as the ability of states to get others to do what they 
otherwise would not (through both tangible and intangible means), then it is 
possible to ascertain that Brazil vies for multiple favorable outcomes in terms of 
political, economic, and technical cooperation issues, when dealing with African 
countries.2 In such interpretation, though, often enough permeated by a recurrent 
1 This article was made possible during a research period at the Institute of International Relations-University 
of Brasilia (IREL-UnB) from April to June 2013. The author would like to thank the IREL’s grad students 
and faculty, with special reference to Prof. Alcides Costa Vaz, for all the support shown during his stay. Andrés 
Malamud and Cláudia Almeida provided invaluable comments to first drafts of this article. Full responsibility 
over its final content, however, remains with the author alone.
* University of Lisbon (ICS-UL), Lisbon, Portugal (pedronunoseabra@gmail.com).
2 Regarding international relations, and despite ample debate over the years, the field “not only lacks a common 
conception of power, it also lacks a common framework in which to situate the various conceptions and their 
expressions” (Mattern 2008, 695). Barnett and Duvall, for example, deem power as “the production, in and 
through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate” 
(2005, 42). Dahl’s classic take on the issue (“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would otherwise not do”), however, continues to retain considerable appeal and is therefore at the center 
of this article’s argument (1957, 202–203).
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“soft power” thread, important thematic features would appear to be missing and 
different narratives to be excluded. More specifically, considerations of a more 
strategic and security-related nature would appear to not find echo in the full 
spectrum of current Brazilian-African interactions.
With such context in mind, and drawing from extensive field research 
undertaken in Brazil in mid-2013 as well as previously undisclosed data, this article 
seeks to complement the existing vectors of analysis by showing how Brazil has 
also put previously overlooked material resources to use in order to attain harder 
strategic goals towards the continent. By focusing on defense cooperation ties 
between 2003 and 2013, it highlights an important niche in Southern transatlantic 
relations that has equally grown exponentially over the last decade, with important 
consequences on how Brazil exerts power across the Atlantic.
In order to sustain the core reasoning driving the article, this analysis starts 
by highlighting not only the three major pillars of Brazil’s renewed engagement 
towards Africa, but also how they are effectively conveyed in terms of power 
predicaments. Afterwards, some theoretical considerations are developed with the 
purpose of distancing oneself from the overly debated dichotomy “soft power/hard 
power” and reach a more streamlined approach to the issue in question, based on 
a country’s material resources. The third section then addresses how such kind 
of resources have been growingly acknowledged in Brazil’s official guidelines and 
regional multilateral involvement towards Africa, followed by an accurate and 
updated depiction of the state of defense cooperation relations between Brazil 
and African countries between 2003 and 2013, with a specific focus on defense 
cooperation agreements, military training, equipment sale and joint exercises. 
Finally, it concludes with some closing remarks stressing the need for a more 
wholesome approach when addressing Brazilian-African relations.
Brazil and Africa: the standard arguments
Behind Brazil’s push for closer relations with African countries throughout 
the last decade, it is possible to find a customary emphasis on a number of driving 
reasons or goals, which end up leading, one way or the other, the two sides of 
the Atlantic towards each other. For his part, White proposes a working structure 
around the three main features, namely “political diplomacy, neo-mercantilism 
and development cooperation” (2010, 228). Similarly, Vizentini sees Brazil’s 
initiatives as falling within the categories of “political discourse/prestige diplomacy” 
and “economic interest/soft imperialism”, or a combination of both, aiming for 
“socio-economic development/southern solidarity” (2010, 80). In either case, and 
despite the varying degrees of applicability, the overall reasoning can be traditionally 
summed up into three sets of explanatory vectors. 
Right from the start, current Brazilian-African relations have been framed 
within the wider political significance of South-South relations per se. Considered 
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an instrumental component of Brazilian foreign policy agenda during the Lula 
years, this particular approach was essentially connoted with the fulfillment of a 
larger international insertion agenda that implied Brazil taking its place among 
the world’s elite as a consensually-recognized rising power. Even though it would 
be more accurate to speak of a revival of past traditions—some would opt to 
call it a “rebirth” of sorts instead (Saraiva 2010, 174)—than really a brand new 
foreign policy orientation, Lula da Silva’s government clearly sought to bring it 
to the forefront of priorities, and that alone represented a contrast with previous 
administrations (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009, 86–87).3
Lula’s revamped foreign policy efforts thus involved brokering a number of 
alliances where African votes were fundamental for Brazil’s external goals—like 
in the trade negotiations of 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, which gave birth to the 
original G-20 or even in the unsuccessful campaign for a Brazilian permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council—but also in promoting new multilateral forums that 
tried to accommodate new shifting patterns of power in the evolving international 
order, like the institutionalization of IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) or the 
South American-African Heads of State and Government Summits. In that sense, 
recognition of “southern heterogeneity” (Lima and Hirst 2006, 36) clearly became 
pivotal for Brazilian policymakers, as evidenced, for example, by the opening of 
19 new embassies in Africa between 2003 and 20134 or the countless trips by 
Brazilian officials to Africa.5 
But a second possible rationalization of Brazil’s motives, which escapes the 
strictly political parameters, lies with acknowledging the trade and economic 
opportunities that have emerged since Brazil started “reconnecting” with Africa. 
A 417% and 433% increase in Brazilian exports and Brazilian imports to and 
from Africa, respectively, from 2002 to 2012, undoubtedly accounts for evidence 
of a rising trade pattern. But this trend is even better expressed by values of 
their common trade balance: during the same period of analysis, it witnessed an 
overall 426% increase, from US$ 5 billion to US$ 26.5 billion—including an 
all-time record of US$ 27.7 billion in 2011 alone (Brasil, Ministério das Relações 
Exteriores 2013).
Moreover, Brazil also saw in Africa tremendous potential for the expansion 
of its own companies, with Brazilian conglomerates such as Vale, Petrobras, 
Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, Queiroz Galvão, OAS or Camargo Corrêa 
making their way into the continent or reaffirming their position in some African 
3 For an account of Brazil’s previous overtures towards Africa see, for example, Saraiva (1996), Pimentel (2000) 
and Ribeiro (2008; 2009).
4 By 2011, the total of embassies on the ground amounted to 37, which provided Brazil with the 5th largest 
diplomatic network in Africa, only behind such countries as the US (49), China (48), France (46) and Russia (38).
5 Including former-President Lula’s 28 visits to 23 African countries, former-Foreign Relations Minister Celso 
Amorim’s 67 visits to 31 countries, President Dilma Rousseff ’s 3 visits to 7 countries, and former-Foreign Relations 
Minister Antonio Patriota’s 20 visits to 13 countries.
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countries where they were already present, with significant investments on local 
mining, oil exploration, civil construction and agriculture projects. In turn, these 
entry points were facilitated by the combined effect of the different stimuli and 
support provided by both the Brazilian Development Bank—Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES)—and the Brazilian Trade and 
Investment Promotion Agency—Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e 
Investimentos (APEX-Brasil). 
However, despite the continuing validity and recurring use of the 
aforementioned vectors, a third different factor has assumed a central role in 
the government’s discourse, when addressing these specific relations, namely the 
common historical-cultural links that connects the Brazilian society to populations 
in Africa. Special emphasis was thus given to the notion of indebtedness between 
Brazil and Africa, in a departing from past “culturalist” interpretations of Brazil’s 
African roots and its own views as a racial democracy role model for Africa.6
The subscription of that change in tone then led to “the replacement of a 
silent period in [Brazil’s] relationship with Africa for a cycle of cooperation and 
common altruistic projects for the other side of the South Atlantic” (Saraiva 
2010, 174). That, in turn, was reflected in the amount of cooperation projects 
developed throughout the last few years. In 2010 alone, for example, the Brazilian 
Cooperation Agency—Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC)—was in charge 
of managing nearly 300 different cooperation projects, with varying degrees of 
execution, in 37 African countries, all the while Africa accounted for 57% of 
all Brazilian technical cooperation disbursed in that same year (Brasil, Agência 
Brasileira de Cooperação 2010; Cabral 2011, 21).
Brazil and Africa’s power relation
After briefly reviewing the three main vectors of engagement with Africa, it 
is important to understand how they have been generally characterized in terms 
of exerted influence across the continent. Unsurprisingly, the “soft power/hard 
power” distinction, as theorized by Joseph Nye (1990), permeates such perceptions. 
The South-South political emphasis, for instance, succeeded in being constructed 
under an innocuous light, or at least one that did not seem to require the use 
of more forceful instruments, i.e. “hard power.” Eschewing the use of Brazilian 
material resources in the country’s political interactions with African countries 
thus constituted a distinct trademark during this period of time. As Hurrell so 
accurately notes:
6 For an account of how the “culturalist” discourse influenced Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa until the 
early 1990s, see Saraiva (1993).
A hArder edge: refrAming BrAzil’s power relAtion with AfricA
81
Re
v
is
ta
 B
Ra
si
le
iR
a
 d
e 
Po
lí
ti
ca
 in
te
Rn
a
ci
o
n
a
l
In keeping with both its perceived identity and its power-related interests, 
Brazil continues to forswear a hard-power strategy in favor of a heavy emphasis 
on multilateralism […]. In part, Brazil’s approach reflects its relative power 
position. Brazil is a threshold state that seeks entry into the ranks of the 
powerful, but for whom coalitions with other developing countries continue 
to make sense. (Hurrell 2008, 53, 57).
Likewise, Brazil’s economic insertions were also consistently presented in a 
different optic from similar inroads made by external powers in Africa, as they 
were wrapped up in larger common development goals. In other words, “more 
than an exchange of products,” South-South trade came to be considered an 
“exchange of knowledge and capabilities that [can] help [to] ensure the sustainable 
and competitive admittance of the least developed countries in the international 
market” (Biato 2010). Or as the minister of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade, Fernando Pimentel, puts it, “Brazil seeks a strategy of international insertion 
oriented towards universal welfare among all peoples” (2012). As a result, Brazilian 
investments and operations in Africa end up being casted as valid alternatives on 
the ground, and specially so, when compared with other international suitors 
(Romero 2012).
On the other hand, by acknowledging that power can also “be exerted through 
cooperative mechanisms” (Dauvergne and Farias 2012, 905), Brazil sought to place 
initiatives, such as the ones carried out by ABC, at the center of the country’s 
foreign policy strategy. Particular emphasis was assigned to the fact that most of 
these same initiatives were developed while based on pre-established historical 
and cultural linkages and professing enough tact to assimilate African specific 
dynamics. Former- minister of External Relations Celso Amorim corroborated 
such preferential traits, when stating:
Beyond incidental political and economic gains, the search for closer relations 
with Africa [has been] guided by historic, demographic and cultural bonds. 
(Amorim 2010, 233).
These bonds, in return, incited further cooperative dynamics. As Guzzini 
exemplifies, when elaborating on general power relations, “if an event is understood 
as analogous to ‘Munich’, a collective memory is mobilized that authorizes some 
action and undermines the legitimacy of others” (2010, 5). A similar parallel with 
Brazil’s historical connections with Africa can certainly be deducted in this case: 
by recalling a common past legacy, Brazil is able to insert itself in the African 
context as opposed to other external players, who do not possess such kind of 
linkages in the first place.
Overall, the ventures hereby mentioned thus reflect a continued perception 
of Brazil as a country above the fray in the larger African context, who does not 
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make tangible resources the core of its appeal when establishing or developing new 
partnerships across the Atlantic. Instead, shared understandings and experiences as 
well as the evocation of a common background are considered mostly responsible 
for empowering Brazil when reaching out to Africa, while allowing to secure a 
favorable outcome as one of the continent’s leading new partners. This, however, 
has natural implications when it comes to assess Brazil’s actual power relation with 
Africa nowadays for it puts the emphasis on a narrative that abstains itself from 
accounting farther tangible initiatives amidst such growing ties. The following 
section will therefore focus on exploring the usefulness of focusing on material 
resources when trying to tackle such kind of issues, amidst the ever-evolving 
debate over the composition of power.
A step back on power
Any attempt to address the concept of power in itself immediately hits a 
wall when coming across the overly amplified notions of soft and hard power. 
Without seeking to undercut the merits of such approach in expanding the debate 
and elaborating on the influence of intangible variables in any power relationship, 
it is equally important to recognize its shortcomings. Indeed, resorting to soft 
and hard power considerations not only brings with it a considerable level of 
conceptual confusion but also limits any potential exercise to a simplistic view 
of power relations. While appealing in some cases, it can prompt an overlook of 
other important factors as well.
Hence, concentrating on how power is actually designed and constructed can 
result more productive for the analysis of a specific power relation. Long overcome, 
though, is the consideration of power as a sole entity intrinsic to such factors as 
the military, wealth or geography, which indicated the strength of actors, and 
consequently the capacity to affect or control events. In that regard, Dahl’s work 
proved instrumental for it opened the door to the recognition of, among many 
others, “‘fuzzier’ variables, such as the scope and norms of states’ relationships,” 
as potential sources of power (Mattern 2008, 692). The multidimensionality 
of this relational approach, in which power came to represent an established 
relationship between two actors, rather than a single “element of national power,” 
thus developed itself at the expenses of the previously-excessive focus on resources.
Still, over the years, a fact remained: “although resources should not be 
confounded with power, they can [still] be useful in measuring it” (Baldwin 2013, 
275, 280). In that sense, revisiting or reaffirming their actual weight in a power 
relation cannot be deemed baseless, and more so if their ultimate purpose is equally 
re-interpreted. Military resources, for instance, need not to be considered solely in 
terms of force or threat of force. At its core lie instruments that are equally capable 
of exerting influence through less confrontational ways, i.e. that can be used in 
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alternative contexts, towards an equally successful outcome, without permanently 
forswearing its potential “forceful” traits.7
Defense cooperation ties between different countries are a case in point. 
They can take up multiple sub-forms, including the training of foreign militaries 
apparatus, international military education programs, regular joint exercises, or 
even humanitarian assistance and relief to disaster-stricken countries (Nye 2011, 
47), all the while using the technical and logistical means that come with the 
possession and potential projection of military power. Admitting the current use 
of such kind of material means in any given relation is therefore to recognize that, 
even if continuingly framed by shared ideas, the pursuit of mutual trust, common 
beliefs, a single value system or any other constructivist trait—as relational power 
ultimately sees it—, they also play a part in increasing or decreasing a country’s 
influence over a targeted partner in a determined issue.
Hence, taking a step back in this debate and envisioning the fundamental 
elements behind any power strategy as a point of reference for a specific analysis 
might just prove more useful. Developing this topic in its entirety, however, would 
require further length than what this article entitles. What suffices to bear in 
mind is that this proposed take does not imply returning to the primal focus on 
resources, as it happened in the early days of the debate over the concept of power, 
but rather merely adjusting the lens of focus used so far. Such methodological 
decision, however, can only be taken when faced with sufficient evidence of 
increased awareness to these issues in a given country. Indeed, as Baldwin points 
out, “the accuracy of one’s estimate of whether an architect has adequate raw 
materials to complete his or her project is likely to improve if one first ascertains 
whether the architect plans to build a birdhouse or a cathedral” (2013, 277). 
Accordingly, Brazil’s growing acknowledgment of the need to reinforce the use 
of such resources as well as its inclusion in the development of African-related 
multilateral platforms will be now explored.
Hardening Brazil’s stance on Africa
Despite the early account in this article of how Brazil’s power towards Africa 
is essentially constructed as a consensus-building, historically-based approach, 
more materialistic views on the subject have not been inexistent. Even if framed 
by soft power/hard power tenets, former minister of External Relations Celso 
Amorim’s positions in recent years are a case in point. Already as Defense Minister 
of President Dilma Rousseff ’s cabinet, he stated:
7 This issue has already been tentatively explored in terms of Brazil’s own military power (Alsina Jr. 2009, 175; 
Bertonha 2010, 114), but solely focused on how military capabilities can be considered in terms of direct force 
and indirect force/symbolism.
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I do not believe in the possibility of separating power beyond the analytical 
field. In other words, soft power separated from hard power means a diminished 
power or a power that cannot be applied to its full potential. It is evident 
that the so-called hard power cannot be used indiscriminately. But, I should 
highlight that it is the hard power that prevails in extreme situations. Therefore, 
the Brazilian influence capacity at global scale is largely conditioned by the 
increase of its tout court power in relation to other nations. That includes, of 
course, military power. (Amorim 2011, 7–8).
Moreover, in an op-ed in 2013, he went further in his reasoning while 
reaffirming:
[…] no country can rely on soft power alone to defend its interests. Indeed, in 
an unpredictable world, where old threats are compounded by new challenges, 
policymakers cannot disregard hard power. By deterring threats to national 
sovereignty, military power supports peace; and, in Brazil’s case, it underpins 
our country’s constructive role in the pursuit of global stability. That role is 
more necessary than ever. (Amorim 2013).
With these declarations in mind, it is possible to acknowledge how harder 
resources of power figure high in Amorim’s calculus. Especially when he goes 
as far as to provide the example of Brazil “pursuing increased bilateral defense 
cooperation with African partners,” as a confirmation that they have indeed been 
used (Amorim 2013). But it is also important to situate Africa amidst Brazil’s 
defense and strategic priorities in order to understand such alleged increased focus. 
A swift analysis of Brazil’s strategic guidelines in recent years allows to pinpoint 
the level of priority attributed to the African continent, inevitably framed by the 
South Atlantic in-between.
The 2008 National Defense Strategy, for example, indicates that the most 
acute defense concerns for Brazil reside not only in the North and West regions 
but also in the South Atlantic, all the while considering a possible “threat of an 
armed conflict in the South Atlantic region” as a factor to take into consideration 
when developing the conditions for the future deployment of Brazilian Armed 
Forces and urging the increase of Brazil’s military presence in that same area 
(Brasil, Ministério da Defesa 2008, 13, 48, 49). On the other hand, the National 
Defense Policy in its revised edition of 2012 states that while “seeking to deepen 
its ties of cooperation, [Brazil] envisions a strategic environment that exceeds 
the mass of the subcontinent and includes the projection along the limits of the 
South Atlantic and bordering countries in Africa.” Moreover, “Brazil attaches 
priority to the countries of South America and Africa, especially the ones in West 
Africa and of Portuguese language” (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa 2012b, 4.1, 5.9). 
Following that same line of thought, the most recent version of Brazil’s Defense 
White Book mentions that, “the protection of lines of communication and trade 
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routes with Africa has strategic significance for the country” (Brasil, Ministério 
da Defesa 2012a, 51). 
The expression of such clear formalization of Brazil’s interest in the stability 
and security of this area can also be found amidst the strong investment in several 
regional organizations and fora that provide additional multilateral coverage. 
At the top of the list stands the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South 
Atlantic—Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (ZOPACAS)—, brought 
back from institutional hibernation in 2007, during the VI Ministerial Meeting at 
Luanda, Angola, with strong Brazilian backing, and which has since then picked 
up the rhythm of activities. The latest meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, on early 
2013, for example, could not stress enough the “need to continue to preserve the 
South Atlantic region free from the scourge of war, the instability of conflict, drug 
trafficking, piracy,” while emphasizing linkages to Africa’s own security context 
(Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul 2013, 11). The same logic applies 
to trilateral defense cooperation through the IBSA Joint Defense Working Group 
(DJWG) since 2004 onwards.
The Community of Portuguese Language Countries—Comunidade dos Países 
de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP)—, on the other hand, has also began to increase its 
stake in defense matters, including the formulation of a common ocean strategy 
and the deepening of consultations on a ministerial level over defense and sea 
matters. During a gathering of this sort, Amorim himself admitted:
Since I assumed Brazil’s Defense Ministry, I have made clear the priority I attach 
to cooperation with Africa and, in particular, with our Portuguese-speaking 
partners, in order to increment naval, land and air defense capabilities. The 
potential of cooperation extends from the lessons learned with joint exercises 
between our forces, to the formation, in practice and without artificiality, of 
a CPLP security and defense identity. (Amorim 2013, 5).
Whether through its strategic guidelines or by means of multilateral 
instruments with a vested interest in this area, it thus becomes clear how Brazil 
prioritizes these issues. More importantly, it is evident that the matter of using and 
building upon the country’s own material resources are not entirely unconsidered, 
not the least of which by the country’s own officials. It now remains to be seen 
how that translates itself in practice.
Brazilian defense cooperation with Africa
In the case of Brazil and Africa, previous attempts to cover the issue of 
transatlantic defense cooperation ties have either turned out solely focused on 
South Atlantic dynamics (Abdenur and Neto 2013) or incomplete (Aguilar 2013). 
Bearing in mind the central purpose of the article, this section will opt to cover 
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Brazilian efforts while regarding Africa as a whole so as to encompass the full 
spectrum of initiatives carried out during the period of analysis.8 It will therefore 
concentrate on a number of sub-areas, representative of the underlying intensity 
of overall cooperation in this domain, with a specific focus on defense cooperation 
agreements, training of military personnel, sale or donation of military equipment, 
and joint exercises/good-will visits.
Defense cooperation agreements
In terms of Brazil and Africa relations in defense cooperation, a considerable 
increase of formal instruments between Brazil and countries in the region was 
witnessed during the period in question. Between 2003 and 2013, a total of nine 
general defense cooperation agreements were signed with such partners as Angola 
(2010), Equatorial Guinea (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Mozambique (2009), 
Namibia (2009), Nigeria (2010), São Tomé and Príncipe (2010), Senegal (2010), 
and South Africa (2003).9
The expressed rationale hardly ever differed for the main dispositions were 
also, often enough, virtually identical. High-level visits by the respective country’s 
civil and military leaderships, contacts between military learning institutions, 
implementation and development of joint programs in defense technology and, 
specially, exchange of personnel for training purposes, frequently recurred in such 
agreements, as exhibited by the comparison in Table 1.
8 Brazil has defense attachés in Angola (with accreditation in São Tomé and Principe), Namibia, Nigeria, 
Mozambique, and South Africa, while attachés from Angola, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa are 
presently stationed in Brasília. 
9 As of late 2013, and according to the Division of International Acts of Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations, 
none of these agreements had gone through all the necessary formalities and could be considered fully ratified. 
Still, that delay has not hampered cooperation endeavors to begin on the ground.
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Three exceptional cases concerning these formal bonds are worthy of 
greater mention. The first resides with Namibia, with whom Brazil has worked 
extensively on such matters since 1994, including through the establishment of 
a Naval Mission in Walvis Bay, thus effectively helping to build Namibia’s Navy 
from scratch. Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, received considerable Brazilian 
efforts towards the stabilization of its notorious unlawful security sector, with its 
height consisting of the Brazilian Mission for Technical-Military Cooperation—
Missão Brasileira de Cooperação Técnico-Militar (MBCTM). However, disruption 
of internal order due to, yet again, another coup brought such project to a halt 
and the current suspension of its envisioned activities. Finally, the establishment 
of the core of a future Brazilian Naval Mission in Cape Verde, as formalized on 
August 2013, and in charge of assessing the conditions and needs of the country 
for the design and implementation of a full-fledged mission in a near future, 
heralds a new phase of engagement with this country.
Military training
Training opportunities for foreign military has consistently played a part in 
Brazil’s outreach to neighbors and partners, and Africa has been no exception. 
As seen in Table 2, Brazilian Air Force institutions, such as Escola de Comando e 
Estado Maior da Aeronáutica (ECEMAR), Academia da Força Aérea (AFA) or Centro 
de Instrução Especializada da Aeronáutica (CIEAR) trained a total of 65 African 
officials during the 2003–2013 timeframe. Comparisons with previous years are 
interesting to make, as the opportunities available were then overall negligible. 
Hence, only after 2003 did such process gained any traction, albeit with constantly 
modest numbers.
A hArder edge: refrAming BrAzil’s power relAtion with AfricA
89
Re
v
is
ta
 B
Ra
si
le
iR
a
 d
e 
Po
lí
ti
ca
 in
te
Rn
a
ci
o
n
a
l
Table 2. Military training of African officials in Brazilian Air Force  
institutions (2001–2013).
Years
Countries
Angola Cape Verde Guinea Bissau Mozambique Namibia Nigeria South Africa
2001 1 - - - - - -
2002 - - - - - - -
2003 - - - 3 - - -
2004 5 2 - 3 - - -
2005 - - - - - - 2
2006 4 2 - - 1 - 1
2007 5 - 5 - - - -
2008 - 1 2 - - - -
2009 3 - - 4 - - -
2010 1 - 2 4 - - -
2011 - - - 6 - - -
2012 - - - 2 - 1 -
2013 4 - - 2 - - -
Total 23 5 9 24 1 1 3
Source: data gathered under the Law for Information Access, no. 12527, October 18, 2011.
Data from Brazilian Army institutions, on the other hand, is far scarcer, 
as official numbers from 2008 onwards are still considered confidential and, 
therefore, have not yet been made available. Still, between 2005 and 2007, a total 
of 29 African officials were trained in such kind of specialized institutions, like the 
Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN), Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior 
do Exército (ECEME), Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (EsAO) or Escola de 
Instrução Especializada (EsIE), as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Military training of African officials in Brazilian Army  
institutions (2005–2007).
Years
Countries
Angola Cape Verde Namibia Nigeria São Tomé and Príncipe
2005 6 2 - 1 2
2006 8 - 3 - -
2007 6 - - 1 -
Total 20 2 3 2 2
Source: data gathered under the Law for Information Access, no. 12527, October 18, 2011.
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However, amongst the Armed Forces branches, the Brazilian Navy is 
unbeatable in this regard, as a total of 1,933 African officials received specialized 
training in institutions like Escola Naval (EN), Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN) or 
Centro de Instrução Almirante Alexandrino in the last decade. The weight of Namibia 
in these numbers is undeniable, as evidenced by Table 4. Between 2003 and 2013, 
over 1,897 Namibian Navy personnel benefited from these kinds of programs.
Table 4. Military training of African officials in Brazilian Navy  
institutions (2002–2013).
Years
Countries
Total
Angola Namibia Nigeria Mozambique São Tomé and Príncipe Senegal
2003 - 57 - 4 - - 61
2004 - 112 - 2 - - 114
2005 - 49 - - - - 49
2006 - 112 - 6 - - 118
2007 - 80 - - - - 80
2008 5 117 - - - - 123
2009 - 315 - - - - 315
2010 - 383 - - - - 383
2011 - 221 - - - - 221
2012 - 238 - - - - 238
2013 13 213 1 6 2 2 237
Total 13 1,897 1 18 2 2 1,933
Source: data gathered under the Law for Information Access, no. 12527, October 18, 2011.
The abovementioned numbers, however, do not account for Brazilian 
instructors that provided or are currently providing training in Africa. In this 
case, Namibia comprises, yet again, another good example, as Brazil’s Technical 
Support Group for Naval Marines—Grupo de Apoio Técnico de Fuzileiros Navais 
(GAT-FN)—proved instrumental in the creation of Namibia’s Marine Corp first 
battalions. Meanwhile, in Benin, during the 2008–2012 period, the West African 
Training Center for Humanitarian Mine Action—Centre de Perfectionnement 
aux Actions Post Conflictuelles de Déminage et de Dépollution (CPADD)—in Uidá 
received four missions by seven Brazilian experts, in charge of providing specialized 
training to local personnel.
On the other hand, in light of growing African demand for such 
opportunities, since 2009, the Defense Ministry and the ABC have collaborated 
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in a new oversight of foreign military training programs, eventually formalized 
in 2010 between the latter and the Defense Ministry’s Department of Internal 
Administration in a technical-cooperation agreement. Over US$ 1.5 million 
was thus spent in the last five years, as evidenced by Table 5, with Mozambique 
(US$ 803,010.65) comprising the greatest recipient of these programs, followed 
by Angola (US$ 314,198.48). Even though the focus originally resided in African 
Lusophone countries, it is possible to observe that new partners, like Nigeria and 
Senegal, also became recipients of these opportunities in recent years.10
Table 5. Amounts budgeted and spent by ABC in military training programs 
with African countries (2009–2013).
Countries US$
Years Total by 
country2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Angola
Budgeted - 181,200.00 434,400.00 150,000.00 30,000.00 795,600.00
Spent - 54,419.68 167,634.90 83,658.54 8,485.36 314,198.48
Cape Verde
Budgeted - 242,000.00 55,600.00 25,800.00 9,000.00 332,400.00
Spent - 42,198.38 24,006.22 21,868.38 4,229.69 92,302.67
Guinea-Bissau
Budgeted - 81,000.00 15,300.00 - - 96,300.00
Spent - 32,169.26 10,157.85 - - 42,327.11
Mozambique
Budgeted 48,166.65 371,264.00 347,500.00 410,897.20 168,950.00 1,346,777.85
Spent 17,310.28 101,698.40 272,469.64 336,272.20 75,260.13 803,010.65
Nigeria
Budgeted - - 22,000.00 19,500.00 12,800.00 54,300.00
Spent - - - 5,658.28 6,122.96 11,781.24
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
Budgeted - 70,800.00 55,600.00 51,600.00 260,280.00 438,280.00
Spent - 56,708.48 46,403.95 47,101.19 44,919.22 195,132.84
Senegal
Budgeted - - 66,000.00 19,500.00 57,680.00 143,180.00
Spent - - - 16,812.52 35,723.26 52,535.78
Total  
per year
Budgeted 48,166.65 946,264.00 996,400.00 677,297.20 538,710.00 3,206,837.85
Spent 17,310.28 287,194.20 520,672.56 511,371.11 174,740.62 1,511,288.77
Source: data provided by ABC.
10 It should be noted that the numbers presented in Table 5 do not reflect the complete cost of these initiatives, 
given that they only cover airfare and accommodation in Brazil. As repeatedly underscored in interviews for 
this article, the total cost of formation is never accounted for, since it does not include the actual worth of the 
position made available at Brazilian military institutions. Moreover, previously established programs, like the 
one with Namibia, remain outside of ABC’s scope.
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Equipment sales and donations
Regarding the sale of Brazilian defense equipment, Embraer’s flagship product, 
the A-29 Super Tucano aircraft comprises the number one item garnering the 
bulk of interest amongst African countries, as evidenced by the multiple deals 
in recent years: in 2011 Angola acquired six units, worth US$ 91 million, while 
Mauritania and Burkina Faso also bought three each. The latest purchase occurred 
on May 2013, during the Latin America Aero and Defense (LAAD) exhibition in 
Rio de Janeiro, where Senegal formalized its own acquisition of three A-29 Super 
Tucano aircraft for US$ 67 million, together with a program for local training of 
pilots and equipment maintenance. On the other hand, the donation of up to two 
Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante patrol aircrafts and three Embraer Tucano-T27 
training aircraft to Cape Verde and Mozambique, respectively, is only currently 
awaiting the requiring legislative authorizations.
But national maritime industry has also seen its fair share of work due to 
African markets alone. In 2004, Brazil donated to Namibian authorities the 
former Brazilian corvette Purus, later renamed NS Lt. General Dimo Hamaambo. 
Afterwards, Brazil built the 200-ton Naval Patrol ship, NS Brendan Simbwaye 
and two smaller patrol boats, the LP Terrace Bay and the LP Möwe Bay, both 
delivered to Namibia in 2009 and 2011, respectively.
A class-Barroso corvette as well as a Professional Qualification Program for 
Navy Personnel was agreed upon in 2010 with Guinea-Equatorial’s authorities11 
and a similar deal was signed with Senegalese authorities in 2013 with a declaration 
of intent foreseeing the future acquisition of two patrol vessels (one of 500 t and 
the other of 200 t), together with a Professional Qualification Program for Navy 
Personnel, at the cost of US$ 53 million.
Finally, donations of Brazilian hardware and equipment to smaller African 
countries have also been recurrent, with a special focus on Lusophone partners. 
São Tomé and Príncipe’s Coast Guard, for example, received four small boats and 
a shipment of 200 uniforms while Guinea-Bissau received another 300 uniforms 
for its Armed Forces. Likewise, on March 2012, a Brazilian supply of uniforms 
worth US$ 169,000 was provided to Cape Verdean Coastal Guard forces.
Exercises, observers and good-will visits
An alternative method of cooperating with Africa in the defense domain 
resided in good-will tours carried out by Brazilian Navy vessels in African shores, 
which have equally increased in the last decade. For instances, in the summer of 
2010, the corvette Barroso visited Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Namibia, 
Nigeria and São Tomé and Principe. Afterwards, the newly constructed Ocean 
11 This particular purchase, however, never concretized after the initial agreement. The ill-fitting of the vessel 
to Equatorial Guinea Navy’s actual needs is considered one of the reasons for the breakdown of the deal.
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Patrol Vessel—Navio Patrulha Oceânico (NPaOc) Amazonas—spent August 
2012 sailing between Benin, Cape Verde, Nigeria and São Tomé and Principe. 
The following NPaOc, Apa, undertook a similar track by visiting Mauritania, 
Senegal, Ghana, Angola, and Namibia, during its maiden trip on March–April 
2013, while the Araguari visited Cape Verde, Liberia, Nigeria, São Tomé and 
Principe, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea on August–September of the same 
year, often engaging in bilateral exercises, maintenance formations, and anti-piracy 
demonstrations with officials and military personnel of the country visited.
Participation in regional exercises has also been constant. Since 1995, Brazil 
has joined South African, Argentinean and Uruguayan navies on a biannual basis 
in the ATLASUR operations.12 Moreover, India, Brazil and South Africa have 
gathered routinely under the IBSAMAR banner with three editions until this 
point (2008, 2010, and 2012). Similar initiatives within the CPLP framework 
have also been pursued, with the FELINO exercise comprising the most visible 
example of Lusophone cooperation in this area. The last of this kind was even 
organized by the Brazilian Navy itself, on September 17–27, 2013, off the coast 
of Espírito Santo state. On the other hand, planning is already under way for a 
joint exercise between Angola, Brazil, the DRC, Namibia, and South Africa on 
African soil, titled ATLANTIC TIDINGS, and expected to start in 2014.
Finally, Brazil has also contributed, albeit discreetly, with a consistent number 
of observers in a multitude of operations in African shores, organized or led by 
other third parties. For example, from February 27 to March 1, 2012, for the 
first time ever, two Brazilian Navy officers attended the OBANGAME EXPRESS 
2012 exercise, carried out under the US-led African Partnership Station (APS) 
program. This presence was replicated and augmented in the exercise’s 2013 
edition, with six Brazilian officers attending the maneuvers on February 19–28. 
Likewise, Brazilian observers have also been present in anti-piracy operations off 
the coast of Somalia, namely with an officer stationed in the General Staff of the 
European Naval Force (EU-NAVFOR), Operation Atalanta, throughout 2012, 
as well as with another officer in the command structure of the Combined Task 
Force-151 (CTF-151), in late 2013.13 
Conclusion
Branding an emerging power’s foreign policy initiatives as abiding to soft or 
hard power tenets can easily become an alluring exercise, and specially so when 
the former appears to increasingly trump the latter, as if somewhat confirming 
the predominantly benign or positive traits of a country’s external insertion. But 
12 Although ATLASUR exercises first originated in 1993 between South Africa and Argentina, only two years 
later did Brazil and Uruguay join in.
13 CTF-151 is a multinational force, in charge of fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia’s coast under 
a UN mandate, in conjunction with the EU’s Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield.
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instead of exclusively sticking to such considerations, this article sought to take a 
step back in the present debate and highlight the continuing relevance of specific 
material resources amidst the composition of power.
As demonstrated, when it comes to the analysis of Brazilian-African relations, 
these resources have been overlooked in terms of defense cooperation ties. Whether 
we choose to call it hard, material, or tangible, the employment of resources 
originating in traditional military assets is real and, more importantly, fits into 
the larger context of strategic imperatives driving Brazil to increase its use towards 
Africa. The existence of a far more materialistic and strategically-driven agenda 
from Brazil towards Africa than what has been publically transmitted until this 
point, is therefore amply underscored. That does not mean, however, that shared 
past experiences and consensus-building strategies do not and will not continue 
to prevail throughout the bulk of the overall transatlantic power relation. But it 
does posit the question of whether the research focus is not too exclusively set 
on such traits, thus contributing to disregard different scopes of said relation.
Hence, in order to begin to understand Brazilian-African interactions in a 
more wholesome fashion, one must first acknowledge that Brazilian security and 
defense concerns match an active and increased cooperation with African partners, 
in terms of developing their local capabilities to adequately control and protect 
their own territories and resources so that Brazil’s security is correspondingly 
assured. Reframing the discussion in a way as to include these variables and their 
evolution over recent years is to undoubtedly apprehend how Brazil has come to 
tentatively make good use of its own material resources so as to influence a wide 
array of outcomes in Africa.
Bibliographic references
ABDENUR, Adriana, SOUZA NETO, Danilo (2013). Brazil in the South Atlantic: growing 
protagonism and unintended consequences. NOREF Policy Brief. [http://www.peacebuilding.
no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/7f8201c01207875357d3052f3dbe3965.pdf ]. 
Accessed on November 12, 2013.
AGUILAR, Sérgio L. C. (2013). Atlântico Sul: As Relações do Brasil com os Países Africanos no 
Campo da Segurança e Defesa. Austral: Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais, 
Vol. 2, N° 4, Jul-Dez 2013, p. 49-71.
ALSINA JR., João Paulo Soares (2009). O poder militar como instrumento da política externa 
brasileira contemporânea. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 52, Nº 2, 2009, 
p. 173-191.
AMORIM, Celso (2010). Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula: An overview. Revista 
Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 53, Special Edition, 2010, p. 214-240.
________ (2011). Transcript - Brazil and the World: Opportunities, Ambitions and Choices 
- Speech delievered at a Chatham House-CEBRI conference, 7 April 2011. [http://www.
chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/070411jobim.
pdf ] Accessed on 13 November 2013.
A hArder edge: refrAming BrAzil’s power relAtion with AfricA
95
Re
v
is
ta
 B
Ra
si
le
iR
a
 d
e 
Po
lí
ti
ca
 in
te
Rn
a
ci
o
n
a
l
________ (2013). Intervenção do Ministro da Defesa, Celso Amorim, na XIV Reunião de Ministros 
de Defesa da Comunidade dos Países de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP), Maputo, 22 de Maio de 2013. 
[www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2013/pronunciamentos/discurso_ministro/cplp_22maio2013.
pdf ]. Accessed on October 20, 2013.
________ (2013). Hardening Brazil’s Soft Power. Project Syndicate. [http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/a-more-robust-defense-policy-for-brazil-by-celso-amorim]. Accessed 
on 13 November, 2013.
BALDWIN, David (2013). Power in International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse and Beth Simmons, Handbook of International Relations. London et al: Sage, p. 273-297.
BARNETT, Michael, DUVALL, Raymond (2005). Power in International Politics. International 
Organization, Vol. 59, N° 1, p. 39-75.
BERTONHA, João Fábio (2010). Brazil: an emerging military power? The problem of the 
use of force in Brazilian international relation in the 21st century. Revista Brasileira de Política 
Internacional, Vol. 53, N° 2, p. 107-124.
BIATO, Marcel Fortuna (2010). La apuesta de Brasil por el comercio Sur-Sur. Economía 
Exterior, N° 52, p. 29-38.
BRASIL, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (2010). A Cooperação Técnica do Brasil para a África. 
[http://www.abc.gov.br/Content/abc/docs/CatalogoABCAFRICA2010_P.pdf ]. Accessed on 
September 3, 2013.
________, Ministério da Defesa (2008). Estratégia Nacional de Defesa. [www.defesa.gov.br/
projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_portugues.pdf ]. Accessed on 
December 14, 2012).
________, Ministério da Defesa (2012). Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional. [www.defesa.gov.br/
arquivos/2012/mes07/lbdn.pdf ]. Accessed on December 14, 2012.
________, Ministério da Defesa (2012). Política Nacional de Defesa. [www.defesa.gov.br/
arquivos/2012/mes07/pnd.pdf ]. Accessed on December 14, 2012.
________, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento de Promoção Comercial e 
Investimentos, Divisão de Inteligência Comercial (2013). Intercâmbio Comercial Brasil-
África. [www.brasilglobalnet.gov.br/ARQUIVOS/IndicadoresEconomicos/ICBrasilAfrica.pdf ]. 
Accessed on October 25, 2013.
CABRAL, Lídia (2011). Cooperação Brasil-África para o desenvolvimento: Caracterização, 
tendências e desafios. [http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/09904.pdf ]. Accessed on 
October 1, 2013.
DAHL, Robert (1957). The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, N° 3, p. 201-215.
DAUVERGNE, Peter, FARIAS, Déborah (2012). The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development 
Power. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, N° 5, p. 903-917.
GUZZINI, Stefano (2010). Power analysis: Encyclopedia entries. DIIS Working Paper N° 34. 
[http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2010/WP2010-34-Power%20Analysis%20
-%20Encyclopedia-Entries-web.pdf ]. Accessed on November 11, 2013.
HURRELL, Andrew (2008). Lula’s Brazil: A Rising Power but Going Where? Current History, 
Vol. 107, N° 706, p. 51-57.
Pedro Seabra
96
LIMA, Maria R. S., HIRST, Mônica (2006). Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: 
action, choice and responsabilities. International Affairs, Vol. 82, N° 1, 2006, p. 21-40.
MATTERN, Janice Bially (2008). The Concept of Power and the (Un)discipline of International 
Relations. In Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 691-698.
NYE, Joseph (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: 
Basic Books, 336 p.
________ (2011). The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 320 p.
PIMENTEL, Fernando (2012). Brasil e África do Sul: uma parceria para um novo mundo. 
[http://www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/artigos/1903]. Accessed on November 20, 2013.
PIMENTEL, José V. S. (2000). Relações entre o Brasil entre a África subsaárica. Revista Brasileira 
de Política Internacional, Vol. 43, N° 1, 2000, p. 5-23.
RIBEIRO, Cláudio O. (2008). Crise e castigo: as relações Brasil-África no governo Sarney. 
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 51, N° 2, 2008, p. 39-58.
________ (2009). As relações Brasil-África entre os governos Collor e Itamar Franco. Revista 
Brasileira de Ciência Política, N° 1, 2009, p. 289-329.
ROMERO, Simon (2012). Brazil Gains Business and Influence as It Offers Aid and Loans in 
Africa. The New York Times. [www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/americas/brazil-gains-in-
reaching-out-to-africa.html?_r=0]. Accessed on November 11, 2013.
SARAIVA, José Flávio S. (1993). Construção e Desconstrução do Discurso Culturalista na 
Política Africana do Brasil. Revista de Informação Legislativa, Vol. 30, N° 118, 1993, p. 219-236.
________ (1996). O lugar da África: A Dimensão Atlântica da Política Externa do Brasil. 
Brasília: Editora da UnB, 280 p.
________ (2010). The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic 
Policy. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 53, Special Edition, 2010, p. 169-182.
VIGEVANI, Tullo, CEPALUNI, Gabriel (2009). Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: 
The Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula. Maryland: Lexington Books, 169 p.
VIZENTINI, Paulo (2010). South-South Cooperation, Prestige Diplomacy or “Soft 
Imperialism”? Lula’s Government Brazil-Africa Relations. Século XXI, Vol. 1, N° 1, Jan-Dez 
2010, p. 65-84.
WHITE, Lyal (2010). Understanding Brazil’s new drive for Africa. South African Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 17, N° 2, 2010, p. 221-242.
ZONA DE PAZ E COOPERAÇÃO DO ATLÂNTICO SUL (2013). VII Encontro Ministerial 
da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul, Declaração de Montevideo, Janeiro 14-16, 2013. 
[http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/vii-encontro-ministerial-da-
zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-zopacas-declaracao-de-montevideu]. Acessed on 
October 5, 2013.
Submitted March 5, 2014
Accepted Maarch 14, 2014
A hArder edge: refrAming BrAzil’s power relAtion with AfricA
97
Re
v
is
ta
 B
Ra
si
le
iR
a
 d
e 
Po
lí
ti
ca
 in
te
Rn
a
ci
o
n
a
l
Abstract
Brazil’s rapprochement with Africa during the last decade has been mostly explained as an attempt 
to improve political dialogue, raise economic interactions, and provide technical cooperation 
assistance. This article, however, argues that such framework does not sufficiently account for 
the use of Brazilian material resources in order to attain harder strategic goals towards the 
continent. By focusing on defense cooperation ties, it highlights an important niche in South-
South relations that has also grown exponentially, with important consequences on how Brazil 
exerts power across the Atlantic.
Keywords: Africa; Brazil; defense cooperation; material resources.
Resumo
A reaproximação do Brasil com a África durante a última década tem sido explicada em grande 
parte como uma tentativa de melhorar o diálogo político, aumentar as interações econômicas 
e fornecer assistência de cooperação técnica. Este artigo, entretanto, argumenta que esse 
arcabouço não representa suficientemente o uso de recursos materiais para atingir metas 
estratégicas mais difíceis para o continente. Focando nos laços de cooperação em defesa, 
ressaltamos um importante nicho nas relações Sul-Sul que também cresceram exponencialmente, 
com importantes consequências sobre como o Brasil exerce poder através do Atlântico.
Palavras-chave: África; Brasil; cooperação em defesa; recursos materiais.
